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Abstract 
Using a dynamic general equilibrium model calibrated for the Czech Republic, we first 
estimate the impact of structural shocks on the observed realizations of the interest rate 
and inflation, while the main focus is put on the estimation of monetary policy shocks. 
These occur whenever monetary policy is not set in accordance with the observed state 
of the economy and the inflation target. Our results suggest that monetary policy was 
more restrictive than implied by the observed state of the economy and the inflation   
target in three periods: 1998Q2–1999Q1, 2001Q3–2003Q2, and 2004Q3–2005Q4. On 
the contrary, the period from 2003Q3 to 2004Q2 was characterized by relatively loose 
monetary policy. Based on the assumption that monetary policy focuses on a different in-
flation target than the officially announced one, we estimate the implicit trajectory of 
the inflation target for the Czech Republic. This implied target fluctuates between 2 and 
3 percent in 2002–2007. 
1. Introduction 
The inflation targeting regime was introduced by the Czech National Bank 
(CNB) in January 1998. During the first six months of that year, inflation was above 
the first inflation target set for the end of 1998. It then dropped well below the target 
during fall 1998, and the CNB subsequently also undershot its targets for the year- 
-ends of 1999 and 2000. It was only in 2001 that the CNB actually hit the inflation 
target. The introduction of a continuous target in January 2002 failed to bring a clear 
improvement in target fulfillment. Holub and Hurník (2008) report that from Janua-
ry 2002, when the continuous target was introduced, till the end of 2007, inflation 
moved below the target midpoint for some 90 percent of the time and below the tar-
get interval for 51 percent of the time. 
The Czech economy was not the only transition economy that experienced 
disinflation following the introduction of inflation targeting
1, but it stands out in 
terms of inflation being below the declared inflation targets most of the time. This 
undershooting of the inflation target was undoubtedly due to many reasons. In this 
paper, we focus in more detail on one of the possibilities, namely, on the role that 
may have been played by monetary policy itself. 
* This paper represents the authors’ own views and does not necessarily reflect those of the Czech Natio-
nal Bank or the International Monetary Fund. We would like to thank Michal Andrle, Aleš Bulíř, Martin 
Čihák, Viktor Kotlán and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. However, all errors and
omissions remain entirely the fault of the authors. 
1 Battini, Kuttner, and Laxton (2005) and Bulíř et al. (2008) have documented successes in decreasing infla-
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Using a dynamic general equilibrium model, we analyze monetary policy with 
respect to the publicly declared inflation target. The underlying rationale of our ap-
proach is that monetary policy should be analyzed with the  help of an  economic 
model that contains monetary policy, but is such that its parameterization is inde-
pendent of monetary policy (Lucas, 1976).
2 A structural economic model, encom-
passing central bank behavior and certain sets of observed economic variables, 
should therefore be used in order to understand the historical development of mo-
netary policy properly. Similarly to Smets and Wouters (2007), both the economic 
model and the set of observed economic variables are then used to estimate economic 
(structural) shocks, including a monetary policy shock. The heart of the method used 
thus consists in explaining, with the help of the economic model, the observed dyna-
mics of the economic variables with economic shocks. Those shocks include changes 
in technology, changes in consumer preferences, exchange rate shocks, and monetary 
policy shocks. 
Monetary policy shocks and their impact on nominal interest rates and infla-
tion are obviously of primary interest in this type of analysis. If any part of the ob-
served realization of nominal interest rates can be attributed to a monetary policy 
shock, we conclude that the  central bank set interest rates either above or below 
the  level consistent with the  observed state of the  economy and the  published in-
flation target. An error in the monetary policy settings (i.e., a monetary policy shock) 
occurs whenever the central bank misinterprets the observed state of economy or sets 
interest rates otherwise than would be consistent with the observed state of the eco-
nomy and the inflation target. 
With a lag, we then identify the impact of the monetary policy shocks on the de-
viations of inflation from the inflation target. That does not mean, of course, that 
whenever, for example, a positive monetary policy shock occurs, observed inflation 
will necessarily, with some lag, appear below the inflation target. In practice, as a re-
sult of other shocks, inflation may well hit the target precisely or even exceed it. 
The virtue of the method applied is that even in such a case, we are able to estimate 
the impacts of monetary policy shocks and document whether or not monetary policy 
was set consistently with the declared inflation target. Another advantage of the me-
thod consists in the fact that, in order to identify monetary policy shocks, it makes no 
difference what analyses the central bank actually based its decisions on. The result-
ing identification of monetary policy shocks, while being subject to the specification 
of the economic model used, is in fact independent of the analytical framework used 
within the central bank. 
It definitely applies, on the other hand, that the identification of monetary po-
licy shocks in itself only provides information on when the central bank set nominal 
interest rates below or above the level consistent with the observed state of the eco-
nomy and the inflation target, without actually revealing why the central bank did so. 
Some conclusions, albeit only quite weak ones, on the reasons may be arrived at 
through analysis of other shocks identified at the same time as the monetary policy 
shock, or before or after such time. If, for example, we identify a strong monetary po-
licy shock together with a counteracting exchange rate shock both affecting observed 
2 This condition gains even more in importance when the hypothesis cannot be excluded that monetary 
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interest rates, we may be able to judge a slow response of monetary policy vis-à-vis 
the exchange rate shock. The isolated presence of a monetary policy shock may then 
actually be a sign of incorrectly directed interest rates.
3 
The presence of monetary policy shocks, especially when they generally point 
in one direction, could lead economic agents to assume that the central bank de facto 
targets an inflation rate that is different from the declared target. In such circum-
stances, the inflation target may be treated as an unobserved variable and estimated 
by methods applied to other unobserved variables. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 contains a description 
of the model and the estimation method. Section 3 follows up with a description of 
the estimated results, i.e., an analysis of the deviation of nominal interest rates and 
inflation from their long-term values in response to different shocks. Section 4 pre-
sents an estimate of the inflation target in the absence of monetary policy shocks, and 
Section 5 summarizes all the results. 
2. The Model and the Estimation Method 
As indicated above, the basic principle of our method consists in identifying 
economic shocks (directly unobserved) using a structural model of the Czech econo-
my and information contained in the  observed variables, where the  link between 
the observed and unobserved variables is represented by the economic model itself. 
The model selection criteria are then defined by the questions we attempt to answer. 
In our case, analyzing the  economy under the  inflation targeting regime requires 
the model to include endogenous monetary policy and to reflect its transmission me-
chanism fairly. The  point is that if monetary policy were absent from the  model, 
the expectations of economic agents could not be accurately described (Lucas, 1976). 
The  model should at the  same time have a  sufficiently rich supply (production) 
structure to enable it to be calibrated on the observed data and to enable the use of 
the information contained within the GDP components.  
2.1 Structure of the Model 
The economy is described using a  dynamic general equilibrium model, 
an earlier version of which was described in (Beneš, Hlédik, Kumhof, Vávra, 2005). 
The version that we use is discussed in detail by Andrle, Hlédik, Kameník, and Vlček 
(2008). In this paper, we therefore provide only a verbal description of the key fea-
tures of the model. The model includes the sectors of households, intermediaries in 
the financial market, domestic producers of intermediate goods, importers of inter-
mediate goods, producers of final consumption goods, exporters, and producers of 
capital goods. The model also includes the central bank and government. 
Households consume the final goods basket and accumulate capital, lend ca-
pital, and supply differentiated labor force to domestic producers of intermediate 
goods. Furthermore, households directly trade in domestic bonds and, through finan-
cial market intermediaries, also in foreign currency denominated bonds. Households 
own all firms and, in proportion to their investments, share in the firms’ profits. In 
3 “Incorrectly directed” should be taken to include leaving the interest rate at its current level in a situation 
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addition to corporate profits, households are recipients of government transfer pay-
ments. Households’ wage contracts are rigid, i.e., households cannot re-optimize 
their wage contracts in each period. Those households which are not able to optimize 
their wage contracts then index their wages to the last observed increase in wages. 
Finally, households move within a competitive insurance market (Yaari, 1965) that 
ensures that heterogeneous wages have no impact on the distribution of wealth among 
households. This enables us to use the representative household concept. When ac-
cumulating capital, i.e., during their investment activity, households face adjustment 
costs associated with the required capital level (Kim, 2003). 
Financial market intermediaries operate in a perfectly competitive financial 
market and their operations are expected to always cover two periods. During 
the  first period, intermediaries obtain funds from households and invest them in 
the  international financial market; in the  second period, they close their positions 
and  return the  invested funds to households. There are always two intermediary 
groups in each of the periods, one of them in the first stage of the financial operation 
and the other in the second stage. When investing, intermediaries face transaction 
costs, the existence of which is necessary for achieving model stationarity (Schmidt- 
-Grohé, Uribe, 2003). The transaction costs are a government revenue (one can think 
of this as a fee imposed on the financial intermediation sector). 
Domestic producers of intermediate goods hire capital and labor force from 
households and, while operating on a monopolistically competitive market, each of 
them produces one type of intermediate good. For production, they use identical 
technology that involves labor-augmenting technological progress. Producers maxi-
mize their profits subject to constraints represented by the technologies used, the costs 
of production factors, and the non-zero probability that they will be unable to optimize 
their product price in every period. Differentiated intermediate goods are then com-
bined with no additional costs into a composite intermediate good that is sold to pro-
ducers of final goods (for private consumption, export, and government consumption). 
In addition to the sector of domestic intermediate goods producers, there is 
also a sector of intermediate goods importers included in the model. Each importer 
combines its imported intermediate good from various foreign goods, the prices of 
which are derived from the  prices of those goods in the  relevant currencies and 
the nominal exchange rate. Similarly to domestic intermediate goods producers, im-
porters of intermediate goods face a non-zero probability that they will be unable to 
optimize their product price in every period. Imported intermediate goods are then 
sold to the sectors of consumer, export, and capital goods producers. 
Final consumption goods producers also operate on a  monopolistic market 
and use domestic and imported intermediate goods as production inputs. The pro-
portions in which the two types of intermediate goods are used are determined by 
production technology with constant elasticity of substitution. Rigid nominal prices 
exist in this sector like in other sectors, i.e., producers are unable to optimize their 
price in each period. 
Exporters, too, use both domestic and imported intermediate goods for pro-
duction, while the proportions of the goods used are again determined by production 
technology with constant elasticity of substitution. Exporter prices are rigid, as in 
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the domestic currency. Exports from the local economy compete with exports from 
various other countries and share imports of the foreign economy. Foreign demand 
for domestic export goods then may be expressed as a share of foreign imports, with 
the proportion being determined by the relative price of export goods to the price of 
foreign goods.  
Capital goods producers use only imported intermediate goods for production. 
This specification is based on the high share of imports in investment expenditures as 
well as on our effort to avoid quick overflow of increased capital accumulation into 
the production of domestic value added. As in other sectors, producers in this one are 
unable to optimize their prices every period. 
The last production sector comprises government consumption goods produ-
cers. Similarly to the capital goods sector, in this sector producers use only a single 
production input, specifically a domestic intermediate good. Once again, producers 
are unable to optimize their production price in each period.  
Finally, the model contains the government and the central bank. On the go-
vernment revenue side, there are taxes and transaction costs (fees) from financial 
intermediation and accumulation of capital. On the expenditure side, the government 
makes transfer payments and purchases government consumption goods. The  go-
vernment may accumulate debt, but must remain intertemporally solvent. This is 
achieved by applying a fiscal rule that adjusts the flow of government transfer pay-
ments in a way that ensures governmental intertemporal solvency. Government con-
sumption is then coupled with household consumption. The central bank is expected 
to carry out credible monetary policy under the inflation targeting regime. In order to 
achieve its inflation target, the bank manipulates the nominal interest rate, taking into 
consideration the current value of the interest rate and responding to deviations of 
expected inflation from the inflation target. Specifically, the central bank responds to 
deviations of year-on-year consumer price index growth from the inflation target at 
a one-year horizon. The potential impacts of different specifications of the monetary 
rule on the results are discussed in section 2.4. 
2.2 Technology Trends and Long-term Growth 
It is important for our method to avoid any ad hoc de-trending of the observed 
time series. Therefore, the model structure is extended for both nominal and tech-
nology trends so as to enable direct use of the observed nonstationary time series. 
While the nominal trend is a single one and is determined by targeted infla-
tion, six different real technology trends have to be used to replicate the observed 
data. The  most important of these include general labor-augmenting technology, 
which enters the production function in the domestic intermediate goods producer 
sector; the specific technology of the export sector, which maintains the competiti-
veness of exporters in foreign markets; and the specific technology of the investment 
sector, which helps to explain increases (decreases) in the share of investment in 
gross domestic product. 
In addition to the above-mentioned real trends, the model employs a specific 
trend in the labor supply, which enables us to explain long-term changes in the par-
ticipation rate; a specific technology trend in government consumption goods pro-
duction, which helps to explain changes in the share of government consumption in Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 58, 2008, no. 9-10                                459 
gross domestic product; and a specific technology trend describing changes in the qua-
lity of export goods. The latter helps to explain the observed increase in the share of 
domestic exports in foreign imports taking place despite no observed change in re-
lative prices of domestic exports to foreign prices. 
The use of all of the above trends is driven both by economic logic and by 
the need to explain the observed data of a converging economy. It holds that real 
variables do not grow necessarily at an  identical growth rate, while the  nominal 
shares of the components of gross domestic product stay constant.
4 The trend growth 
rates of technologies, as well as the shocks hitting those rates, are estimated as un-
observed variables jointly with an estimate for all other structural shocks. 
2.3 Calibrating and Testing 
Andrle, Hlédik, Kameník, and Vlček (2008) discuss in detail the calibration 
methods and tests of the  model based on the  data sample for the  period from 
1996Q1 to 2007Q4. The main idea followed in the model calibration is the “minimal 
econometric approach” as suggested by Geweke (1999), and the methods used in-
volve analysis of impulse responses, forecast error variance decomposition, analysis 
of the model properties over time and spectral domains (King, Watson, 1996), and 
recursive forecasting. Andrle, Hlédik, Kameník, and Vlček (2008) report inter alia 
on the ability of the model to forecast inflation at a 2-year horizon. 
2.4 Estimation Method 
The first step in identifying structural shocks is to solve the model for its 
reduced form (Blanchard, Kahn, 1980), or (Uhlig, 1995), which involves substitution 
of forward-looking (non-predetermined) variables with a linear combination of past 
shocks. However, given the non-linear nature of the model, its equations have to be 
log-linearised first. 
A reduced-form of the model serves as a starting point for the estimation of 
structural shocks based on the method of Kalman filtration. The Kalman filter applies 
a reduced form of the model extended for measurement equations that map the ob-
served variables to the unobserved. Together they represent the “state description of 
the model.” The form is as follows: 
                                                           = + tt t Z yx ε                                                     (1) 
                                                          1 − = + ttt T ν xx                                                    (2) 
where x denotes the vector of unobserved state variables, y denotes the vector of 
observed (measurement) variables,ε is a random vector we call process noise, and 
νis measurement noise. For that, we assume a  Gaussian distribution of random 
vectors and of the x state vector’s initial state. 
Based on the state form of the model and using observed variables, the Kal-
man filter identifies all unobserved variables that are part of the model, including 
structural shocks. For linear systems it represents an optimum estimate in terms of 
the least squares criterion (Hamilton, 1994). Application of the filter itself takes on 
the recursive algorithm form, wherein the conditional probability density of the state 
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variables gets updated based on observed variables. The variables used as observed 
in the estimation are set out in Table 1. 
The first step of the algorithm under Kalman filtration is the prediction step. 
During this step, equation (2) is used to estimate the predictive probability density of 
the states at time t based on the previous conditional probability density at time t-1. 
This probability density is, however, nonexistent in the first period of the data sample 
and is therefore substituted with a random vector with a mean value and the uncon-
ditional variance of the state variables as described by equation (2). Due to the pre-
sence of trends within the model and resulting non-stationarity of certain variables, 
the  unconditional variance does not have a  finite value and that is why a  diffuse 
Kalman filter is applied (De Jong, 1991). 
The filtration step follows after the prediction step, representing an update of 
the predictive probability density based on the information contained in the observed 
data. The measurement equation (1) is used for that purpose. Additional information 
drawn from the observed data enables a refined estimate of the state variables, in-
cluding an estimate of the shocks. In addition to the above Kalman filter steps, we 
use a smoothing step of the filter, which, as opposed to the prediction and filtration 
steps, uses complete information from the observed data (Harvey, 1989). 
Application of the  Kalman filter results in identification of the  unobserved 
state variables, including the structural shocks. Similarly to Smets and Wouters (2007), 
the estimated realizations of the different shocks are used in the next stage for his-
torical simulations of the model, with the help of which we quantify the exact im-
pacts of different shocks on the nominal interest rate and inflation. In the historical 
simulation, we therefore simulate the impact of each particular estimated realization 
of shocks (such as an exchange rate shock, a shock to regulated prices, etc.) on the de-
viation of nominal interest rates and inflation from their long-term values. While 
different shocks naturally have different impact directions and strengths in particular 
periods of the data sample, we obtain the actually observed realizations of nominal 
interest rates and inflation by summing the impacts of all the shocks. 
Hence, a solved structural model with endogenous monetary policy is used to 
identify structural shocks, including monetary policy shocks. Using a particular type 
of central bank reaction function may raise doubts as to the robustness of our results 
TABLE 1  Observed Variables for Structural Shock Estimates 
CPI (index)  Foreign 3M interest rates (EURIBOR) 
Regulated prices (index)  Nominal exchange rate (CZK/EUR) 
Net inflation (CPI adjusted for regulated prices, 
index) 
Nominal wage (average wage in business 
sector) 
Consumption deflator (index)  Real consumption (index) 
Investment deflator (index)  Real investment (index) 
Export deflator (index)  Real exports (level) 
Import deflator (index)  Real imports (level) 
Government consumption deflator (index)  Real government consumption (level) 
Foreign prices (PPI, euro area, index)  Foreign demand (real imports of euro area, 
level) 
3M interest rates (PRIBOR)   
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with respect to the form and calibration of the central bank’s reaction function. In re-
ality, there is no such issue. If we assume that, given the structural form of the model, 
we are able to identify absolutely correctly all structural shocks except for the mo-
netary policy shock, then, irrespective of the concrete form of the monetary policy 
rule, it is the monetary policy shock that remains as the only one replicating the ob-
served data. That is why this shock is determined unambiguously regardless of 
the specific form of the monetary policy rule. 
3. Basic Decomposition of Monetary Policy 
This section provides a detailed description of the historical decomposition of 
monetary policy, wherein the  observed realizations of nominal interest rates and 
inflation are analyzed with the impacts of different economic shocks. More precisely, 
we do not analyze the effects of shocks on the nominal interest rate and inflation 
levels, but rather we examine the effects economic shocks have on the deviation of 
the nominal interest rate and inflation from their long-term levels. This follows from 
the key assumption of our analysis – that only economic shocks cause deviations 
of any variable from its long-term level. Such a long-term level is represented by 
the inflation target in the case of inflation and by the sum of the equilibrium real 
interest rate and inflation expectations (or the  inflation target in the  long run) in 
the case of nominal interest rates. 
Figure 1 shows the decomposition of nominal interest rates into the contri-
butions of the estimated shocks in the period from 1997Q1 to 2007Q3.
5 In order to 
facilitate orientation, Table 2 then sets out brief interpretations of those shocks, while 
Table 3 contains exact numbers for the monetary policy shocks. It follows from Fi-
gure 1 that exchange rate shocks were the key determinant of the nominal interest 
rate (its deviation from the long-term level). The other determinants are shocks to fo-
reign interest rates and monetary policy shocks. The latter are crucial for the purpose 
of our analysis. A monetary policy shock appears in the figure whenever the nominal 
interest rate was not fully consistent with the  observed state of the  economy and 
the inflation target. It also holds that whenever such a shock is positive (negative), 
nominal interest rates were set higher (lower) than ideally consistent with the observ-
ed state of the economy and the inflation target. 
The first period following the introduction of inflation targeting for which we 
identify a sequence of positive monetary policy shocks starts in 1998Q2 and ends 
in 1999Q3. The largest contribution of the monetary policy shock is estimated for 
1998Q3–Q4. As a result, we may note that especially during the second half of 1998, 
monetary policy was more restrictive than corresponded to the observed state of 
the  economy and the inflation target. At the same time, the  behavior of the  other 
shocks suggests that the monetary policy shock occurs due to an insufficiently quick 
response by the central bank to the fading anti-inflationary effect of the exchange rate 
shock. We can only speculate on the reasons for such a slow response.  
An explanation may be suggested by considering the monetary policy risk aver-
sion at the launch of inflation targeting. At that time, monetary policymakers faced 
numerous uncertainties regarding the estimation of equilibrium trends and the power 
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of the  transmission channel, as well as an  inefficient banking sector and under-
developed financial market. They were probably also aware that had the declared 
disinflation been unsuccessful, any subsequent attempt would have been much more 
expensive. Therefore, the decision to decrease the interest rate more slowly than would 
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otherwise have been optimal might have been motivated by risk aversion that led 
monetary policymakers to transfer into the  present time a  portion of the  expected 
costs of future disinflation attempts.  
Figure 2 and Table 4 consistently describe monetary policy as a significant 
and comparatively long-term factor of negative deviations of inflation from the infla-
tion target. The above-discussed monetary policy shock itself pushes inflation below 
the inflation target during the period from 1998Q2 to 2000Q2, i.e., over the first two 
years of the new monetary policy regime. 
During the second half of 1999 and then until the second half of 2001, we 
identify no marked monetary policy shocks. It is therefore possible to say that, during 
that period, nominal interest rates were set consistently with the inflation targets and 
the observed economic developments.  
However, as illustrated in Figure 1, the situation began to change in the se-
cond half of 2001, when a marked exchange rate shock hit the economy, followed by 
another shock of falling foreign interest rates. A positive monetary policy shock arose 
TABLE 2  Basic Interpretation of Shocks 
Technology shocks  Sum of shocks identified in all technology trends. 
Demand shock in consumption  Shock identified in household consumption. 
Exchange rate shock 
Shock identified in the exchange rate equation 
(the uncovered interest rate parity) 
Monetary policy shock  Shock identified in the monetary policy rule. 
Foreign interest rate shock  Shock identified in foreign interest rates. 
Regulated price shock 
Shock identified in the regulated price 
development. 
Rest 
Sum of all other identified shocks (such as 
foreign demand, investments and government 
consumption). 
 
TABLE 3  Impact of Monetary Policy Shocks on the Deviation of the Nominal Interest Rate 
from Its Long-term Level (in pp) 
1997Q1  -0.91  2000Q4  -0.25  2004Q3  0.49 
1997Q2  3.13  2001Q1  -0.38  2004Q4  0.74 
1997Q3  -1.24  2001Q2  -0.26  2005Q1  0.76 
1997Q4  -0.49  2001Q3  0.48  2005Q2  0.40 
1998Q1  -0.01  2001Q4  0.95  2005Q3  0.21 
1998Q2  1.35  2002Q1  1.26  2005Q4  0.25 
1998Q3  2.38  2002Q2  1.68  2006Q1  0.12 
1998Q4  2.43  2002Q3  1.44  2006Q2  0.07 
1999Q1  0.92  2002Q4  1.02  2006Q3  0.12 
1999Q2  0.51  2003Q1  0.36  2006Q4  0.15 
1999Q3  0.30  2003Q2  -0.02  2007Q1  -0.13 
1999Q4  -0.09  2003Q3  -0.52  2007Q2  -0.31 
2000Q1  -0.27  2003Q4  -0.61  2007Q3  -0.17 
2000Q2  -0.34  2004Q1  -0.63     
2000Q3  -0.30  2004Q2  -0.19     
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concurrently with a negative exchange rate shock. This may indicate that the reason 
behind the monetary policy shock might have been an insufficiently quick response 
by  the central  bank.  The size  of  the monetary  policy shock rises gradually, while 
the central bank succeeds in damping the tendency as late as in 2002Q3, when the ab- 
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solute size of the monetary policy shock gets decreased, despite the culminating ex-
change rate shock.
6 The described monetary policy shock then adds to the pressure 
on inflation to decrease below the inflation target, as can be seen from the inflation 
decomposition in Figure 2 and Table 4. The shock itself ebbs away in the second half 
of 2003, although its impact on inflation is present until the end of that year.  
The period from 2003Q3 to 2004Q2 was a time of negative monetary policy 
shocks. Nominal interest rates were kept lower during this period than was consistent 
with the observed state of the economy and the inflation target. We identify the most 
marked negative shock in 2004Q1, during the concurrent effects of a positive exchange 
rate shock.
7 In 2004Q3, however, a positive monetary policy shock appears once again 
and survives, albeit very modestly, until 2006Q1. Identically to the previous example, 
the positive monetary policy shock is accompanied by a negative exchange rate shock. 
As opposed to the previous period, the exchange rate shocks tend to follow the mo-
netary policy shocks. As can be seen in Figure 1, while a positive monetary policy 
shock occurs in 2004Q3, a negative exchange rate shock follows only in the fourth and 
subsequent quarters. That might suggest that the central bank itself could possibly have 
partly contributed to the exchange rate shock occurrence, as the foreign interest rate 
caused strong pressure for a low level of domestic interest rates during that period.
8 It is 
therefore possible that the observed state of the economy was not entirely accurately 
assessed in the analyses or monetary policy decision or that the monetary policy set-
tings were adjusted at an unsuitable point in time. 
TABLE 4  Impact of Monetary Policy Shocks on the Deviation of Inflation from Its Long- 
-term Level (in pp) 
1997Q1  0.14  2000Q4  0.12  2004Q3  0.17 
1997Q2  -0.31  2001Q1  0.20  2004Q4  -0.03 
1997Q3  -0.24  2001Q2  0.23  2005Q1  -0.26 
1997Q4  -0.12  2001Q3  0.11  2005Q2  -0.40 
1998Q1  -0.04  2001Q4  -0.12  2005Q3  -0.45 
1998Q2  -0.20  2002Q1  -0.42  2005Q4  -0.43 
1998Q3  -0.61  2002Q2  -0.77  2006Q1  -0.37 
1998Q4  -1.09  2002Q3  -1.04  2006Q2  -0.29 
1999Q1  -1.29  2002Q4  -1.16  2006Q3  -0.23 
1999Q2  -1.27  2003Q1  -1.08  2006Q4  -0.19 
1999Q3  -1.08  2003Q2  -0.85  2007Q1  -0.12 
1999Q4  -0.79  2003Q3  -0.51  2007Q2  -0.03 
2000Q1  -0.47  2003Q4  -0.17  2007Q3  0.04 
2000Q2  -0.20  2004Q1  0.11     
2000Q3  0.00  2004Q2  0.25     
Source: Own calculation 
6 Interest rates were lowered by 0.75 pp in July 2002. During the first half of 2002, the CNB was ad-
ditionally making efforts to stop the exchange rate appreciation by intervening in the foreign exchange 
market. 
7 In 2004Q1, the temporary depreciation of the koruna peaked. The koruna recorded an average of 32.90 in 
that quarter. 
8 In August 2004, the interest rate was increased by 0.25 pp. The decision to increase it followed the July 
forecast, which was consistent with a rising trajectory of interest rates (see the July 2004 Inflation Report). 466                           Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 58, 2008, no. 9-10 
Looking more closely at the results, one cannot ignore the fact that the impact 
of monetary policy shocks on inflation is more persistent than the very existence of 
the shocks. Out of the 39 observed periods (counted from 1998Q1), monetary policy 
was more anti-inflationary than was consistent with the observed state of the econo-
my and the inflation target during 30 periods (and to a comparatively limited extent, 
i.e., less than 0.1 pp, in three out of these observations). 
Whatever the reasons for this behavior, an argument can be certainly made 
that economic agents, based on their own observations, might gradually begin to per-
ceive the  central bank as asymmetric in terms of meeting the  published inflation 
target. In such case, economic agents, instead of regarding the central bank as an in-
stitution that, while making mistakes, nevertheless keeps on following its declared 
inflation target, would perceive it as an institution that in fact pursues another target 
without actually making many mistakes. In the next section, we therefore discuss 
the inflation target estimate as an unobserved (state) variable under the circumstances 
where the  central bank monitors the  state of the  economy and avoids mistakes in 
the monetary policy settings, while being perceived as such by other economic agents. 
4. The Inflation Target as an Unobserved Variable 
In this section we estimate the inflation target as an unobserved variable, 
while the central bank is assumed to be an inflation targeting central bank that does 
not make systematic errors. Observed inflation is thus explained also by a  time- 
-varying inflation target that may differ from the officially declared one. This ap-
proach is similar to the one applied by Ireland (2007), who, based on U.S. data, tried 
to explain persistent changes in U.S. inflation by the time-varying implicit inflation 
target of the Federal Reserve. In contrast to Ireland (2007), however, we do not in-
tend to identify factors influencing the inflation target.
9 In our view, the main weak-
ness of the methodology applied by Ireland (2007) is that he assumes a stable policy 
rule (stable preferences of the FOMC members) over the estimated period and at-
tributes the observed policy stance given the state of the economy to the time-varying 
inflation target and structural shocks entering its reduced form equation in particular. 
We cannot be sure that the  policy rule remained stable over the  estimated 
period. In reality the policy rule might have been changing with changes in the com-
position of the policy body. The methodology applied in Ireland (2007) as well as 
here is in our view indecisive in terms of identifying the true causes of persistent 
changes in observed inflation, e.g., whether the central bank simply varies its reac-
tiveness and allows for more or less persistent deviations of inflation from the target, 
or whether it adjusts its target in the face of structural shocks. Ireland (2007) works 
with two additional implicit assumptions. First, he assumes that the policy rule is 
stable over the estimated period and second, he makes a prior assumption that struc-
tural shocks do influence the inflation target by designing the model structure so as to 
get structural shocks present in the reduced form equation for the inflation target. 
While we also view the policy rule as implicitly stable over the estimated period, we 
are not confident in allowing the structural shocks to enter the equation for the in-
flation target.  
9 Contrary to Ireland (2007), structural shocks are not part of the equation for the inflation target once 
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We therefore estimate the time-varying inflation target without any ambition 
to explain why the estimated target differs from the declared one. We only show how 
the inflation target would look if the target was perceived by economic agents as 
the  central bank’s real target, while at the  same time also being the  target truly 
pursued by the  central bank. Obviously, an  ideal approach would be to estimate 
the implicit inflation target understood by economic agents as being the one followed 
by the central bank, while the bank would in fact follow the formally declared target, 
with mistakes (monetary policy shocks) being allowed. The present economic litera-
ture on heterogeneous expectations and information, however, is still making its first 
strides and is so far unable to provide a sufficiently robust toolkit for practical ap-
plication with real data. 
Figure 3 presents the inflation target estimate together with the declared target 
and inflation. The estimate robustness is at the same time derived from the stability 
of the  estimates for other unobserved variables (technology trends, in particular), 
compared with the situation where the target is observed and monetary policy mis-
takes are allowed. In other words, the robustness and reliability of the estimate is 
derived from an identical estimate of the business cycle. 
Figure 3 shows that the estimated target was below the declared target level 
throughout the period under review, and that the absolute difference between the two 
decreased over time. The earlier periods may have been affected by the rapid dis-
inflation during 1998 and 1999 as well as by our approximation of the inflation target 
(which was declared only for net inflation for the  respective year-ends, and only 
as a corridor).
10 In 2002–2007, when an explicit continuous inflation target trajectory 
was in effect, the  estimated target moves within the  band of 2–3  percent. The  es-














Source: Own calculation 
10 A detailed description of the history of the CNB’s inflation targets can be found in (Kotlán, Navrátil, 
2003) or, more recently, in (Holub, Hurník, 2008). The approximation of the inflation target in headline 
inflation prior to 2002 is based on the targets published for net inflation. To the midpoints of these targets 
(the targets were declared as a corridor), 1 pp is added as the estimated average contribution made by re-
gulated prices to headline inflation, while the targets are interpolated to individual quarters using a linear 
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timated inflation target may be interpreted as being an explanation for the central 
bank’s behavior in the absence of mistakes in monetary policy implementation, while 
the business cycle is estimated as in the previous case. 
5. Conclusions 
The inflation targeting regime was effectively introduced by the  CNB at 
the beginning of 1998. By the fall of that year, observed inflation had fallen mark-
edly below the  inflation target published for that year-end. The  inflation targets 
defined for the subsequent year-ends were also undershot in 1999 and 2000. Holub 
and Hurník (2008) further report that from January 2002, when the continuous target 
was introduced, till the end of 2007, inflation was below target for some 90 percent 
of the time, and even below its lower tolerance limit for 51 percent of the time. 
The above outline history of the fulfillment of inflation targets necessarily 
evokes the question of the reasons for their undershooting, including an obvious em-
phasis on the role of monetary policy itself. This paper has attempted to provide 
an  answer to the  question from the  perspective of a  dynamic general equilibrium 
model designed and calibrated to fit the Czech economic data. 
The strong conclusion of our analysis, derived from the estimation of struc-
tural economic shocks, is that in three periods, Czech monetary policy was more 
restrictive than was consistent with the observed state of the economy and the de-
clared inflation target. Those periods were as follows: 1998Q2–1999Q1, 2001Q3– 
–2003Q2, and 2004Q3–2005Q4. For one period, specifically 2003Q3–2004Q2, we 
identify a relatively loose monetary policy. 
The weak conclusion is our view that the most probable reasons were, in 
the first period, a slow response to an already fading previous pro-inflationary shock, 
in the  second period, a  slow response to an  exchange rate appreciation shock in 
progress, and, in the third period, erroneous directing of interest rates in a situation 
that no longer justified such a step. 
Given the relatively frequent undershooting of the declared inflation target, it 
is conceivable that the de facto inflation target as perceived by economic agents de-
viated from the  inflation target declared by the  CNB. While the  latter hypothesis 
cannot be rigorously tested, our experiment with an unobserved inflation target may 
provide an approximation. An inflation target fluctuating between 2 and 3 percent 
allows us to explain well the CNB’s behavior in 2002–2007.  
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